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Abstract
We present a theory which describes a recently introduced model of an evolv-
ing, adaptive system in which agents compete to be in the minority. The
agents themselves are able to evolve their strategies over time in an attempt
to improve their performance. The present theory explicitly demonstrates the
self-interaction, or market impact that agents in such systems experience.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Agent-based models of complex adaptive systems (CAS) provide invaluable insight into
the highly non-trivial global behaviour of a population of competing agents [1]. These models
typically involve agents with similar capability competing for a limited resource. The agents
are given the same global information, which is in turn generated by the action of the agents
themselves, and they learn from past experience. The growing field of econophysics [2–4]
represents an area in which such CAS may be applicable: every agent knows the past ups
and downs in the index of a stock market and must decide how to trade based on this
global information. An important step forward in agent-based models of CAS was made by
Challet and Zhang [5,6] who proposed the so-called Minority Game (MG) in which an odd
number N of agents successively compete to be in the minority. Each agent is randomly
assigned a limited number of strategies at the beginning of the game, hence introducing some
quenched disorder. As the game progresses, non-trivial fluctuations arise in the collective
agents’ decisions – these can be understood in terms of the dynamical formation of crowds
consisting of agents using correlated strategies, and anticrowds consisting of agents using
the anticorrelated strategies [7]. Subsequent work by Challet and co-workers has provided
a remarkable formal connection to spin glass systems [8].
The basic minority game, however, does not incorporate evolution. Agents are stuck with
their initial strategies and hence the system cannot avoid this in-built frustration. In the
real world, one would expect that agents would be able to evolve more successful strategies,
or at least stop playing disasterous strategies. This motivated us to recently propose a
simpler minority model which allowed for an evolving population [9–11] - we call this the
evolutionary minority game (EMG). D’Hulst and Rodgers [12] subsequently proposed an
analytic theory, based on a slightly modified version of our model. However, the two models
actually give different numerical results [11].
Here we provide a theory for our evolutionary minority game (EMG) [9] which correctly
includes the self-interaction of the agents. Results are in good agreement with numerical
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data. The plan of the paper is as follows. We introduce the EMG in Sec.II and give the
main features observed in numerical simulations of the model. In Sec.III, we present the
formalism and derive the winning probability for an agent. Results from the present theory
are compared with numerical data in Sec.IV. Section V provides a discussion of the results.
II. EVOLUTIONARY MINORITY GAME
Consider an odd number N of agents repeatedly choosing to be in room 0 (e.g. sell) or
room 1 (e.g. buy). After each agent has independently chosen a room, the winners are those
in the minority room. A single binary digit denoting the minority room forms the outcome
for each time-step. Each agent is given the information of the most recent m outcomes. Each
agent also has access to a common register or “memory” containing the outcomes from the
most recent occurrences of all 2m possible bit strings of length m. Consider, for example,
m = 3 and denote (xyz)w as them = 3 bit string (xyz) and outcome w. An example memory
would comprise (000)1, (001)0, (010)0, (011)1, (100)0, (101)1, (110)0, (111)1. Following a
run of three wins for room 0 in the recent past, the winning room was subsequently 1.
Faced with a given bit string of length m, it seems reasonable for an agent to simply predict
the same outcome as that registered in the memory. The agent will hence choose room 1
following the next 000 sequence. If 0 turns out to be the winning room, the entry (000)1 in
the memory is then updated to be (000)0. Simply put, each agent looks into the most recent
history for the same pattern of m bit string and predicts the outcome using the history. In
effect, each agent holds one strategy and all agents hold the same strategy, with the strategy
being dynamical. The strategy is hence to follow the trend. However, if all N agents act in
the same way, they will all lose. A successful agent is one who can follow a trend as long as it
is valid and to correctly predict when it will end. To incorporate this factor into our model,
each agent is assigned a single number p, which we refer to as the “gene”-value. Following
a given m-bit sequence, p is the probability that the agent will choose the same outcome as
that stored in the memory, i.e. he will follow the current predictor. An agent will reject the
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prediction and choose the opposite action with probability 1− p. To incorporate evolution
into our model, we assign +1 (−1) point to every agent in the minority (majority) room at
each time step. If an agent’s score falls below a value d (d < 0), his gene-value p is modified.
The new p value is chosen randomly from a range of values centered on the old p with a
width equal to R. We impose reflective boundary condition to ensure that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Our
conclusions do not depend on the particular choice of boundary conditions. For R = 0,
the agents will never change their gene values - this represents the limiting case of in-built
quenched disorder determined by the initial distribution of p values. For any non-zero R
value, the system is able to evolve through gene modification. For R = 2, the new gene
value is uncorrelated with the old one upon modification.
Initially, each agent is randomly assigned a gene value in the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Choosing
R 6= 0 allows the population to evolve. We focus on two quantities, P (p) and L(p), in the
asymptotic limit. Here P (p) is the frequency distribution of gene values, typically taken
in the long time limit over a time window and normalized to unity; L(p) is the lifespan
defined as the average length of time a gene value p survives between modifications. To
introduce the basic features observed in numerical simulations, Fig. 1 shows L(p) and P (p)
(inset) as a function of p for a range of values of m. The other parameters are taken to be
N = 101, R = 0.2 and d = −4. The most interesting feature is that P (p) becomes peaked
around p = 0 and p = 1, with a similar behaviour in L(p). Both of these quantities are
symmetric about p = 1/2. The results are insensitive to the initial distribution of p values.
Surprisingly the results indicate that agents who either always follow or never follow what
happened last time, generally perform better than cautious agents using an intermediate
value of p. Figure 1 also shows that there is no explicit dependence on m for P (p) and L(p)
[9,11,13]. The independence on m of the results was also discussed recently by Burgos and
Ceva [13] using a random walk argument. Reference [12] proposes a theory which gives a
P (p) somewhat similar to that shown in Fig.1. However, the theory was developed based on
a model in which each agent is initially assigned one strategy from the strategy pool, and
uses this strategy throughout the game: the corresponding P (p) is then m-dependent [11]
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in contrast to the EMG results shown in Fig.1. The dependences on the other parameters
of the EMG such as N , d, and R are reported in Ref. [11].
III. FORMALISM
We consider a game with N agents (N ≫ 1). After a sufficiently long time, the distri-
butions P (p) and L(p) reach the stationary forms as shown in Fig. 1. Consider a certain
moment of the game in this steady-state regime. Let the predictor, which is simply the
strategy stored in the memory for the given history bit-string, be 1; i.e. go to room “1”. As
long as the winning room is defined as the minority room, i.e. with a cutoff at (N − 1)/2,
the following arguments do not depend on the actual value of the predictor and hence also
hold if the predictor says 0. We define FN (n) as the probability of the attendance being n in
the predicted room. It follows from the central limit theorem that FN(n) will be an approx-
imately gaussian distribution with a mean Np and variance N
∫ 1
0 P (p)p(1− p)dp. Here p is
the mean of the gene value p given by p =
∫ 1
0 pP (p)dp, which is known if the distribution
P (p) is known. However, P (p) is the unknown which we are going to solve for. In the steady
state, FN(n) becomes identical to the probability of the attendance in any one of the two
rooms since the two possible outcomes occur equally often on average. Figure 2 shows the
normalized FN(n) in the steady state extracted from the numerical simulations.
In the spirit of self-consistent mean-field theories, the basic idea of the present formulation
is to consider the interaction between a particular agent and the rest of the population. We
present the formulation in a general way so that it can be readily generalized to different
variations of our model. We consider the action of a particular agent, say the k-th player, in
the background of the N−1 other agents. Let GkN−1(n) be the probability of the attendance
being n in the predicted room, given that there are only (N − 1) agents participating in the
game (i.e. excluding the k-th agent). Then FN(n) can be written in terms of G
k
N−1 as
FN (n) = pkG
k
N−1(n− 1) + (1− pk)GkN−1(n), (1)
where n 6= 0, N . Here pk is the p-value of the k-th agent at that moment. The physical
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meaning of Eq.(1) is transparent. An attendance of n in room “1” is achieved if the atten-
dance by the (N − 1) agent background is n − 1 and the k-th agent decides to go to room
“1”: this leads to the first term in Eq.(1). Alternatively the attendance by the (N−1) agent
background is n and the k-th agent decides not to go to room “1”: this leads to the second
term in Eq.(1).
Let τ(pk) be the winning probability of the k-th agent. Given the probability G
k
N−1(n),
we can write
τ(pk) = pk
(N−3)/2∑
n=0
GkN−1(n) + (1− pk)
N−1∑
n=(N+1)/2
GkN−1(n). (2)
Equation (2) says that the k-th agent wins if (i) the attendance is below (N − 3)/2 in room
“1” before he makes his move and he decides to go to room “1”, thereby giving the first
term or (ii) the attendance is above (N + 1)/2 in room “1” before he makes his move and
he decides not to go to room “1”, thereby giving the second term. Since the k-th agent is
only characterized by his gene value pk, τ(pk) can also be interpreted as the success rate of
an agent using gene value pk. It follows from Eq.(1) that
(N−3)/2∑
n=1
FN(n) =
(N−3)/2∑
n=1
[
pk(G
k
N−1(n− 1)−GkN−1(n)) +GkN−1(n)
]
=
(N−3)/2∑
n=1
GkN−1(n) + pkG
k
N−1(0)− pkGkN−1(
N − 3
2
).
Since FN (0) = (1−pk)GkN−1(0), which follows from the consideration that room “1” is empty
only if the other N − 1 agents do not go to room “1” and the k-th agent does not go to
room “1”, we have
(N−3)/2∑
n=0
GkN−1(n) =
(N−3)/2∑
n=0
FN(n) + pkG
k
N−1(
N − 3
2
). (3)
Similarly, we have from Eq.(1)
N−1∑
n=(N+1)/2
FN(n) =
N−1∑
n=(N+1)/2
[
pk(G
k
N−1(n− 1)−GkN−1(n)) +GkN−1(n)
]
=
N−1∑
n=(N+1)/2
GkN−1(n) + pkG
k
N−1(
N − 1
2
)− pkGkN−1(N − 1).
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Since FN(N) = pkG
k
N−1(N − 1), which follows from the consideration that all the agents go
to room “1” only if all the other N − 1 agents go to room “1” and the k-th agent goes to
room “1”, we have
N−1∑
n=(N+1)/2
GkN−1(n) =
N∑
n=(N+1)/2
FN (n)− pkGkN−1(
N − 1
2
). (4)
Substituting Eqs.(3) and (4) into Eq.(2), we obtain
τ(pk) = pk
(N−3)/2∑
n=0
FN(n) + p
2
kG
k
N−1(
N − 3
2
)
+(1− pk)
N∑
n=(N+1)/2
FN(n)− (1− pk)pkGkN−1(
N − 1
2
).
Using Eq.(1) to express GkN−1(
N−3
2
) in terms of GkN−1(
N−1
2
) and FN (
N−1
2
), we then obtain
τ(pk) = pk
(N−3)/2∑
n=0
FN(n) + (1− pk)
N∑
n=(N+1)/2
FN (n)
+pk
(
FN(
N − 1
2
)− 2(1− p)GkN−1(
N − 1
2
)
)
= pk
(N−1)/2∑
n=0
FN(n) + (1− pk)
N∑
n=(N+1)/2
FN (n)− 2pk(1− pk)GkN−1(
N − 1
2
). (5)
Equation (5) separates τ(pk) into 3 terms, each of which has a physically transparent inter-
pretation. Consider an “outsider”, i.e. someone whose action does not affect the outcome
but instead is only betting on which side is the winning room according to the probability pk.
His winning probability is given by the first two terms in Eq.(5). The third term gives the
difference in the winning probability between an “outsider” of the game and an agent who
actually participates in the game. This term is negative, reflecting the fact that an agent
has a smaller probability of winning when he is actually participating in the game. Consider
the case in which the background population is split evenly between room “0” and room
“1”: the k-th agent loses no matter what action he takes. Thus the third term represents
this self-interaction term, or so-called market impact in financial market terminology. The
pk(1− pk) factor means that the winning probability increases as the gene value pk deviates
more from the value 1/2, and it produces a symmetry about p = 1/2 in L(p) and P (p) as
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shown in Fig.1. Note that Eq.(5) also applies to the case when the predictor says 0: hence
it is independent of the dynamics of the predictor which in turn is determined by the time
evolution of the outcomes. This further implies that the resulting P (p) and L(p) do not
depend on the value of m in the model. For the present EMG, there is a lack of an a priori
perferred room: therefore the outcomes 0 and 1 will occur similar numbers of times on the
average. In this case, the summations in the first and second terms of Eq.(5) in the steady
state yield the value 1/2 and hence τ(p) becomes
τ(pk) =
1
2
− 2pk(1− pk)GkN−1(
N − 1
2
). (6)
In order to express the right hand side of Eq.(5) entirely in terms of the function F , we
use Eq.(1) to find GkN−1(
N−1
2
). From Eq.(1), we have
pkG
k
N−1(n− 2) + (1− pk)GkN−1(n− 1) = FN(n− 1). (7)
Subtracting the equations obtained by multiplying Eq.(1) by (1−pk) and multiplying Eq.(7)
by pk, we can eliminate G
k
N−1(n− 1) to obtain
(1− pk)FN(n)− pkFN(n− 1) = (1− pk)2GkN−1(n)− p2kGkN−1(n− 2).
Repeatedly applying Eq.(1), we can eliminate GkN−1(n− 2), GkN−1(n− 3),· · · to obtain
n∑
j=0
(−1)n−jFN (j)( pk
1− pk )
n−j = (1− pk)GkN−1(n) . (8)
Similarly, if we apply Eq.(1) with increasing values of n instead of decreasing values of n,
we obtain
N∑
j=n+1
(−1)j−n−1FN (j)(1− pk
pk
)j−n−1 = pkG
k
N−1(n) . (9)
Although the results are exact, in practice it makes sense to use Eq.(8) for small pk and
Eq.(9) for pk ∼ 1. Using Eq.(8) or Eq.(9) for n = N−12 and substituting the result into
Eq.(5), we obtain τ(pk) entirely in terms of FN (n), and the label k becomes irrelevant. As
mentioned, τ(pk) can be regarded as the winning probability of an agent who is using a gene
value p, and henceforth we denote it by τ(p) for simplicity.
8
IV. RESULTS
In order to obtain P (p) from τ(p), we note that these two quantities are related. In Ref.
[12], it was pointed out that the stationary distributions P (p) and L(p) are proportional to
each other:
P (p)
L(p)
= constant, (10)
where the right hand side is a constant independent of p. Equation (10) follows from the
balance between the fluxes of agents into and out of a region in p-space in the steady state.
Since an agent using the gene value p loses (1 − 2τ(p)) points each turn [12], the lifespan
L(p) is given by
τ(p) =
|d|
1− 2τ(p) .
From Eq.(10), we have
P (p) ∝ 1
1/2− τ(p) , (11)
with the proportionality constant determined by the normalization of P (p) to
∫ 1
0 P (p)dp = 1.
Based on the present theory, it is straightforward to construct an iterative calculation
scheme for P (p). The steps are the following: (a) assume a form for P (p), (b) obtain FN(n)
by evaluating p and the standard deviation from the assumed P (p), (c) use Eq.(5) together
with Eqs.(8) and (9) to obtain τ(p), (d) calculate P (p) from τ(p) using Eq.(11) and the
normalization condition, (e) check for convergence of P (p) and, if necessary, repeat the
steps until convergence is obtained. Note that Eq. (5) is employed since it is valid for all
forms of initial guess for P (p), including those which are non-symmetrical about p = 1/2.
Results for P (p) and L(p) obtained by carrying out the calculation scheme are shown
in Figs.3 and 4 together with results of numerical simulation for N = 51 and N = 101.
Note that P (p), when properly normalized, is not sensitive to N , while L(p) depends on
N . Results from our theory are in good agreement with numerical data. The results for
P (p) as obtained in Ref. [12] are also shown in Fig. 3 for comparison: note that the results
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of Ref. [12] show a plateau over a significant range of p in contrast to the present theory
and the numerical simulations. The comparison indicates that the results from the present
theory are in better agreement with the numerical results. To further test the validity of our
theory, we compare results for τ(p) as a function of p with numerical data for N = 51, 101,
and 201 in Fig. 5. The numerical data are found by simply counting the number of times
an agent with gene value p wins. It should be noted that τ(p) provides a better test than
P (p) for the validity of any theory, since many forms of τ(p) can give rise to similar forms
for P (p). In contrast to the numerical results and those of the present theory shown in
Fig. 5, the expression for τ(p) given in Ref. [12] gives a very small τ(p) for a significant
range of p around p = 1/2 corresponding to the plateau in P (p). Figure 5 suggests that the
correct τ(p) in the steady state, which follows from Eq.(5) (see also Eq.(6)), has the form
τ(p) ∼ 1/2−A(N)p(1− p) where A(N) is an N -dependent constant which decreases with
N as 1/
√
N . Such a scaling with N makes sense from random walk arguments.
V. DISCUSSION
We have presented a theory of the EMG based on the consideration of a particular
agent in the environment formed by the rest of the population. The winning probability
τ(p) is given in terms of the population distribution in one of the rooms. By relating the
population distribution, the winning probability and the lifespan, an iteration scheme is set
up for calculating the frequency distribution of gene values P (p). Results for P (p), L(p) and
τ(p) are in good agreement with numerical data.
The present formalism can be used to describe different versions of the EMG. For ex-
ample, a generalization of the EMG was recently introduced where the winning ‘room’ (i.e.
winning decision) was assigned according to whether the attendance was lower than a cer-
tain cutoff [14]. For this case, one can modify the limits in the summations in Eq.(2) and
carry out the calculations accordingly. We emphasize that Eq.(5) is applicable even if the
steady state P (p) is not symmetric about p = 1/2. An interesting feature in this generalized
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EMG model is that when the cutoff percentage deviates significantly from 1/2 and becomes
smaller (or larger) than a critical value, the steady state P (p) takes on a form which depends
on the initial distribution of p. In particular, the population distribution P (p) freezes - no
further modification of gene values arises as time evolves for large (or small) enough value of
the cutoff. This phenomenon is discussed in more detail in Ref. [14]. Another generalization
is to modify the way in which the p-value is updated [15]. Future work will focus on ap-
plication of the present theoretical approach to such generalizations of the simple minority
game set-up.
11
REFERENCES
[1] J.H. Holland, Emergence: From chaos to order, (1998) (Addison-Wesley, Reading);
Hidden Order: How adaptation builds complexity (1995) (Addison-Wesley, Reading).
[2] W.B. Arthur, Amer. Econ. Rev. 84, 406 (1994); Science 284, 107 (1999).
[3] H.E. Stanley, Computing in Science & Engineering Jan/Feb, 76 (1999); Physica A 269,
156 (1999).
[4] See the proceedings of the International Workshop on Econophysics and Statistical
Finance published in Physica A 269, 1-183 (1999).
[5] D. Challet and Y.C. Zhang, Physica A 246, 407 (1997); ibid. 256, 514 (1998); ibid.
269, 30 (1999).
[6] R. Savit, R. Manuca and R. Riolo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 2203 (1999).
[7] N.F. Johnson, M. Hart and P.M. Hui, Physica A 269, 1 (1999).
[8] D. Challet and M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E 60, R6271 (1999); D. Challet, M. Marsili,
and R. Zecchina, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 1824 (2000); D. Challet and M Marsili, cond-
mat/9908480.
[9] N.F. Johnson, P.M. Hui, R. Jonson and T.S. Lo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 3360 (1999).
[10] N.F. Johnson, P.M. Hui and T.S. Lo, Phil. Trans. Royal Soc. London A 357, 2013
(1999).
[11] P.M. Hui, T.S. Lo, and N.F. Johnson, cond-mat/0003309.
[12] R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers, Physica A 270, 514 (1999).
[13] E. Burgos and H. Ceva, cond-mat/0003179.
[14] N.F. Johnson, D.J.T. Leonard, P.M. Hui and T.S. Lo, cond-mat/9905039.
[15] H. Ceva, cond-mat/9909424.
12
FIGURES
FIG. 1. The lifespan L(p), which is the average duration between modifications for a gene value
p, as a function of gene value p for m = 1, 2, · · · , 8. The inset shows the distribution of gene values
P (p) as a function of p for different values of m. Both L(p) and P (p) are insensitive to m. The
other parameters are N = 101, d = −4 and R = 0.2.
FIG. 2. The probability of the attendance in one of the two rooms in the steady state, which
is identical to FN (n), obtained by numerical simulations. The parameters are N = 101, m = 3,
d = −4 and R = 0.2. It is approximately a gaussian distribution as expected from the central limit
theorem.
FIG. 3. The frequency distribution of the gene values p as a function of p for N = 101 and
N = 51 (inset). The other parameters are d = −4 and R = 0.2. The dotted lines are the data
from numerical simulation. The solid lines give the results of the present theory. The dashed lines
give the results of the theory proposed in Ref.[12].
FIG. 4. The lifespan L(p) as a function of p for N = 101 and N = 51 (inset). The dotted
lines are the data from numerical simulation. The solid lines give the results of the present theory.
Other parameters are the same as those in Fig.3.
FIG. 5. The winning probability τ(p) as a function of p for different values of N . The solid lines
give the results of the present theory while the dotted and dashed lines are results from numerical
simulations. The three sets of lines from top to bottom at p = 1/2 correspond to N = 201, 101,
and 51, respectively. Other parameters are the same as those in Fig.3.
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